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Justice Thomas’ Kelo Dissent, or, “History as a Grab Bag of Principles”1
David L. Breau 
In Kelo v. City of New London,2 a bare majority of the Court held that economic 
development—creating jobs and increasing tax revenues—satisfies the Fifth Amendment’s 
requirement that property be “taken for public use.”3 Kelo ignited substantial political backlash,4
probably because the Court’s decision permitted a city to use eminent domain to forcibly acquire 
homes from residents who had lived in them for decades.5 The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
argument that taking their property for economic development is not a “public use,” explaining 
that ever since the Court “began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 
19th century, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public 
purpose.’”6 Although Justice Stevens’ majority opinion was the subject of much criticism,7
Justice Thomas’ dissent was probably the most radical of the four opinions in Kelo.8 Thomas 
would have interpreted the Public Use Clause according to what he labels its “most natural 
 
1 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1060 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
2 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
4 See T.R. Reid, Missouri Condemnation No Longer So Imminent; Supreme Court Ruling Ignites Political Backlash,
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2005, at A2 (“[A]ll over the country, . . . Kelo . . . has sparked a furious reaction, with 
politicians of both parties proposing new legislation that would sharply limit the kind of seizure the . . . decision 
validated.”); see, e.g., Jeff Jacoby, Editorial, Eminent Injustice in New London, BOSTON GLOBE, June 26, 2005, at 
D11 (“‘These five justices,’ [said the son of one of the Kelo plaintiffs,] ‘I hope someone looks at their property and 
says, “You know, we could put that land to better use—why don’t we get the town to take it from them by eminent 
domain.” Then maybe they would understand what they’re putting my father through.’”); Benjamin Weyl, Activist 
Tries a Grab for Jurist’s Property, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2005, at A10 (describing an activist’s apparently serious 
suggestion that the city of Weare, New Hampshire use eminent domain to acquire Justice Souter’s vacation home in 
order to build a new hotel). 
5 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668. 
6 Id. at 2662. 
7 In addition to the negative popular reaction, see supra note 4, some of the legal criticisms of Kelo are expressed by 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent, id. at 2672–75, and by the opinion of the dissenting justices in the case when it was 
decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut.  Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 588 (Conn. 2004) 
(Zarella, J., dissenting). 
8 Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Justice 
Kennedy also wrote a separate concurring opinion.  The principle dissent was written by Justice O’Connor, joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas.  Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent, which no 
other justice joined, that is the subject of this article. 
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reading,” namely, as a substantive limitation that “allows the government to take property only if 
the government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the property.”9 In Thomas’ view, the 
majority opinion unjustifiably replaces the Public Use Clause with a “Public Purpose Clause” or 
a “‘Diverse and Always Evolving Needs of Society’ Clause.”10 
In the first half of his opinion, Justice Thomas makes three interrelated arguments to 
support his position that his narrow reading of the Public Use Clause is consistent with its 
“original meaning.”11 First, Thomas begins with a textual analysis of the words “for public use,” 
considering the definition of “use” in a founding-era dictionary and comparing the Public Use 
Clause to other clauses in the U.S. Constitution and in several other contemporary 
constitutions.12 Second, the opinion examines the “Constitution’s common-law background,” 
which Thomas believes “reinforces” the conclusions of his textual analysis.13 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, Thomas almost exclusively relies on the writings of William Blackstone for this 
“common-law background.”14 Finally, Thomas surveys the early states’ eminent domain 
practices and explains how these practices support his understanding of the original meaning of 
the Public Use Clause.15 
The second half of Thomas’ dissent advocates reconsidering the Court’s entire public use 
jurisprudence to conform with the conclusions of his textual and historical analysis.16 He begins 
with the earliest federal cases decided over a century ago that suggested that public use should be 
 
9 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
10 Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2662). 
11 Id. at 2679–80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
14 Id. at 2677, 2679, 2680 (citing Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England). 
15 Id. at 2681–82.  Because the federal government did not exercise its eminent domain authority until many decades 
after the founding, this early practice concerns the states’ eminent domain activity and the limits imposed by state 
equivalents to the Takings Clause.  Id. at 2681.  The first major case concerning an exercise of eminent domain by 
the federal government was not decided until 1872.  DAVID A. SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER, AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 55 (1992). 
16 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2682–86 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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broadly construed and argues that imprecise dicta in those early cases evolved into the holdings 
of later key cases such as Berman v. Parker17 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.18 In 
both these cases, a unanimous Court held that the Public Use Clause is satisfied by a legislature’s 
determination that taken property will be used for a public purpose,19 and the majority opinion in 
Kelo is based in large part on the reasoning of cases such as Berman and Midkiff.20 
This article analyzes the first half of Thomas’ dissent because it provides the fundamental 
reasoning behind his view that the Public Use Clause should be interpreted as it was “originally 
understood,” and his opinion of the significance of the facts in Kelo—and of the precedent on 
which it is based—essentially follow from that fundamental reasoning.  This article does not take 
issue with the “original meaning” inquiry as a method of deciding constitutional cases or the 
propriety of overruling a century of Supreme Court precedent based on historical conclusions of 
questionable accuracy.  Instead, it examines the support that Justice Thomas provides for the 
proposition that the Public Use Clause was originally understood as a substantive limitation that 
allowed a taking “only if the government or the public actually uses the taken property.”21 This 
article argues that Justice Thomas’ understanding of the Public Use Clause’s original meaning is 
merely one possible meaning that the framers may have had in mind, and that at least as much 
historical and textual support exists to support the view that the framers intended the government 
 
17 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954). 
18 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
19 Id. at 242; Berman, 348 U.S. at 36.  
20 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663–66 (discussing Berman, 348 U.S. at 26, and Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229, and concluding 
that there is “no principled way of distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes” recognized 
in those cases).  Interestingly, although Justice O’Connor authored the opinion for the Court in Midkiff, she authored 
the principle dissent in Kelo.
21 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2682 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Thomas alternates between requiring the public to “actually use 
the taken property,” id. at 2682, 2684, and requiring that the public have “a legal right to use” the property, id. at 
2679, 2686.  In some of the early state cases that Thomas relies upon, the public actually used the taken property 
unaccompanied by a formal legal right, id. at 2681, while in other early cases he cites, there was merely a legal right 
to use the property but in actuality, the taking was used only by private parties, id. at 2683–84 (discussing Strickley 
v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906)).  Accordingly, it would seem that Thomas would 
allow either legal or actual use to satisfy the Public Use Clause.  See infra notes 138–141 and accompanying text. 
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to be able to take private property for public purposes such as economic development.22 The 
discussion below draws on the scholarship of William Novak,23 Gregory Alexander,24 David 
Schultz,25 Morton Horwitz,26 and others to demonstrate that many of the historical sources that 
Justice Thomas relies on—particularly John Lewis’ 1888 treatise on eminent domain27—in fact 
support the conclusion that the words “for public use” were originally understood to allow the 
government to take private property for a public purpose, if those words were meant as a 
substantive limitation at all.28 
I. THOMAS’ TEXTUAL ARGUMENTS 
Justice Thomas begins by analyzing the text of the Takings Clause itself to support his 
position that the “original meaning” of the Public Use Clause “allows the government to take 
property only if the government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the property.”29 The 
1773 edition of Samuel Johnson’s well-known Dictionary of the English Language “defined the 
noun ‘use’ as ‘the act of employing any thing to any purpose,’”30 and an 1888 treatise on eminent 
domain noted that the word’s Latin root, utor, means “to use, make use of, avail one’s self of, 
employ, apply, enjoy, etc.”31 From these two sources, Thomas concludes that when property is 
taken pursuant to the Takings Clause, “the government or its citizens as a whole must actually 
 
22 For a brief overview of the variety of influences on eminent domain theory and practice, see generally Harry N. 
Scheiber, The Jurisprudence—and Mythology—of Eminent Domain in American Legal History, in LIBERTY,
PROPERTY, AND GOVERNMENT 217 (Ellen Paul Frankel & Howard Dickman eds., 1989). 
23 WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE (1992). 
24 GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY (1996). 
25 SCHULTZ, supra note 15. 
26 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 (1977). 
27 JOHN LEWIS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1888). 
28 The dispute among the justices in Kelo concerns two related issues.  The first is about the correct meaning of the 
words “for public use,” and the second is the extent to which the Court should defer to legislative determinations of 
whether a particular taking satisfies that substantive standard.  This paper focuses on the first issue because the 
choice of a substantive standard logically dictates an appropriate level of scrutiny—strict scrutiny hardly makes 
sense if almost any public purpose satisfies the Public Use Clause, and extreme deference would truly be an 
abdication of the Court’s role if the standard it were trusting the legislature to apply were a difficult one to satisfy. 
29 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
30 Id. (citing 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2194 (London, 4th ed. 1773)).   
31 Id. (citing LEWIS, supra note 27, at 224 n.4). 
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‘employ’ the taken property.”32 Thomas explains that, as applied to Kelo, it “strains language” to 
say the public is “‘employing’ the property” when “the government takes property and gives it to 
a private individual and the public has no right to use the property.”33 
Regardless of whether the public will in fact have “no right” to use the property at issue 
in Kelo,34 there are several reasons why the language of the Public Use Clause does not compel 
the conclusion that the public must actually employ the taken property.  First, Thomas’ analysis 
ignores a part of Johnson’s definition of the word “use,” focusing on the “act of employing” 
rather than on “to any purpose.”  Taken as a whole, Johnson’s definition of “use” indicates that 
“public use” could mean that the public can “employ any thing”—here, the taken property—“to 
any purpose.”35 Thus, the phrase “property taken for public use” could be understood as “the act 
by the public of employing the taken property to any purpose,” or perhaps even as “the act of 
employing the taken property to a public purpose.”  Given that Thomas begins his opinion by 
criticizing the Court’s replacement of the Public Use Clause with a “Public Purpose Clause,”36 it 
is odd that his textual analysis begins by defining “use” in terms of “purpose.”37 Furthermore, 
Johnson lists nine definitions for the word “use,”38 and Thomas does not explain why the drafters 
 
32 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
33 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
34 See infra notes 129–140 and accompanying text. 
35 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing 2 JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 2194 (emphasis added)). 
36 Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
37 In the eminent domain context, many early state judges do not seem to have distinguished between the words 
“use” and “purpose.”  See, e.g., Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 23–24 (N.Y. 1837) 
(opinion of Edwards, Sen.) (using the terms “public purposes” and “public use” interchangeably); Gardner v. 
Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (opinion of Kent, Ch.) (“I am not to be understood as 
denying a competent power in the legislature to take private property for necessary or useful public purposes . . . .  
But . . . a fair compensation . . . is a necessary qualification . . . in taking private property for public uses.” (emphasis 
added)); Den ex dem. Robinson v. Barfield, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 390, 420 (1818) (opinion of Daniel, J.) (legislature can 
take property only for “public purposes”); Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245, 264 (1828) (opinion 
of Carr, J.) (“The eminent domain . . . extends to the taking private property for public purposes.”). 
38 2 JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 2194–95.  The copy of the 1773 edition of Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English 
Language at Duke University’s rare book room has no page numbers and seems to have been printed without them.  
Therefore, the citations here rely on the page numbers that Thomas cites in his opinion. 
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of the Fifth Amendment must have necessarily intended the particular definition Thomas 
prefers—one of many meanings that the word had at during the late eighteenth century.39 
Second, putting aside the relevance of an 1888 treatise in determining the “original 
meaning” of an amendment drafted in 1791,40 Thomas emphasizes the treatise’s definition of 
“use” as “employ” while ignoring broader terms such as “enjoy.”41 Is it so obviously wrong42 to 
say that the public does not “enjoy” property that, though owned by a private individual, is used 
to improve the local economy and create jobs?  Even in 1888, the original meaning of the words 
“for public use” was far from obvious—Lewis begins his section on public use by quoting an 
1876 Nevada Supreme Court decision: “No question has ever been submitted to the courts upon 
which there is a greater variety and conflict of reasoning and results than that presented as to the 
meaning of the words ‘public use’ . . . regulating the right of eminent domain.”43 
Third, it is questionable whether a textual analysis necessarily supports the conclusion 
that the Public Use Clause is a substantive limitation on the government’s eminent domain 
 
39 Johnson’s second, fourth, and fifth definitions, respectively, are “[q]ualities that make a thing proper for any 
purpose,” “[a]dvantage received,” and “[c]onvenience.”  2 JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 2194–95.  Johnson apparently 
intended the order of definitions to have some significance, and he indicated that the definitions of each word should 
be ordered so as “to exhibit first its natural and primitive signification,” then “to give its consequential meaning,” 
and then its “metaphorical meaning.”  SAMUEL JOHNSON, THE PLAN OF A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(London, J. & P. Knapton et al., 1747).  For a word such as “use” that has nine definitions, order alone does not 
indicate how significant or common each definition was at that time.  Notably, Thomas does not mention 
“[a]dvantage received,” and he rejects the others by arguing that, when “read in context, the term ‘public use’ 
possesses the narrower meaning.”  Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  But as is discussed below, this 
“context” is not as conclusive as Thomas claims.  See infra notes 51–76 and accompanying text. 
40 See NOVAK, supra note 23, at 244–47 (noting that by the late nineteenth century, American legal thought had 
undergone a dramatic transformation, repudiating the “salus populi” principle that dominated the thinking of early 
nineteenth century jurists in favor of “a heightened regard for individual right and liberty”); see also ALEXANDER,
supra note 24, at 322–23 (1997) (noting a decidedly non-originalist position taken by this particular 1888 treatise). 
41 LEWIS, supra note 27, at 224 n.4. 
42 Thomas contrasts his position with the majority’s holding in absolute terms, stating, for example, that the Court’s 
opinion goes “against all common sense,” Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting), that “[t]he Court 
adopted its modern reading blindly,” id. at 2682, and relied on “a line of unreasoned cases wholly divorced from the 
text, history, and structure of our founding document,” id. at 2687. 
43 Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 400–01 (1876), quoted by LEWIS, supra note 27, at 
217. 
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authority.  In fact, Lewis himself seems to disagree with Thomas that the “most natural reading” 
of the Public Use Clause is as a limitation: 
If the intent had been to make the words “public use” a limitation, the 
natural form of the expression would have been: “Private property shall 
not be taken except for public use, nor without just compensation.”  It is 
certainly questionable whether anything more was intended by the 
provision . . . than as though it read, “Private property shall not be taken 
under the power of eminent domain without just compensation.”44 
There simply is not a single “most natural reading” of the Takings Clause, and Justice Thomas’ 
efforts to impose one by citing an eighteenth-century dictionary and a nineteenth-century treatise 
is both mistaken and misleading.45 In fact, Thomas’ position on the meaning of “public use” is 
essentially identical to the position that Lewis believes is the “correct” view.  But although Lewis 
favored the narrow meaning of “public use,” he readily conceded that as many cases had adopted 
“actual use by the public” as had upheld exercises of eminent domain for “public benefit or 
advantage.”46 Furthermore, Lewis cautioned that “[i]f we look to our dictionaries, we find the 
same confusion as in the decisions,” noting that dictionaries define “use” to mean both “[t]he act 
employing any thing for any purpose” as well as “benefit, utility, advantage.”47 While Lewis 
readily states that the position he takes is not compelled by the text, history, or precedent,48 
44 Id. at ii (first emphasis added; quotations around “public use” replace commas and italics in the original). 
45 In fact, scholars have advanced plausible theories of the original meaning of the Public Use Clause that are at least 
as well-supported as, and entirely at odds with, Thomas’ view.  See, e.g., Matthew P. Harrington, “Public Use” and 
the Original Understanding of the So-Called “Takings” Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1298–1300 (2002) 
(arguing that “the phrase, ‘public use’ as found in the Fifth Amendment was not meant to serve as a substantive 
limitation at all,” but merely served to distinguish takings that did not require compensation, such as taxation and 
forfeiture, from expropriations for which compensation was required); Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of 
Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1, 16–18 (1980) (discussing the ambiguity in early state 
constitutions, perpetuated by the language of the Fifth Amendment, about whether the words “for public use” 
signified a substantive limitation on eminent domain). 
46 LEWIS, supra note 27, at 221–24. 
47 Id. at 223. 
48 Id. at 221–23.  In the treatise’s preface, Lewis willingly explains that his position on the meaning of “public use” 
is merely one possibility, and modestly notes that “whether the conclusions reached by the author are correct must 
be left for the reader to judge.”  Id. at ii.
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Thomas excises such qualifications and presents Lewis’ position as if it has always been the only 
plausible original understanding of Public Use Clause.49 
Although Thomas does note that these early sources also define “use” broadly,50 he 
dismisses the possibility that the founders intended the Public Use Clause to be understood 
according to those broader meanings by explaining that when “read in context, the term ‘public 
use’ possesses the narrower meaning.”51 For “context,” Thomas compares the Takings Clause to 
other constitutional clauses in which the term “use” appears (or does not appear), as well as to 
the Takings Clauses in early state constitutions.52 The word “use” appears twice in the 1787 
Constitution, and Thomas argues that in both instances it clearly has a narrow, literal meaning, 
and that therefore the word “use” in Takings Clause possesses that same literal meaning.53 
Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power “[t]o raise and support armies, but no 
appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years,”54 and Article I, 
Section 10 states that “the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any state on imports or 
exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of the United States.”55 Contrary to Thomas’ 
assertion, however, neither of these clauses shed much light on the meaning of “for public use” 
in the Takings Clause.  The “use” referred to in Article I, Section 8 is clearly defined by the 
clause itself—i.e., the use of raising and supporting armies—so that the entire clause means “no 
appropriation of money to raise and support armies shall be for more than two years.”56 The 
phrase “to that use” is not so much a substantive constitutional limitation as it is a prepositional 
placeholder that renders more concise that clause’s grant of power combined with a limitation on 
 
49 See supra note 42. 
50 See supra note 39. 
51 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
52 Id. at 2679–80. 
53 Id. at 2679. 
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (emphasis added). 
55 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
56 Constitutional Prohibition—Appropriations for Armies, 25 Op. Att’y Gen. 105, 106 (1904). 
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its exercise.57 Thus, rather than mandating a “narrow” reading of the word “use,” Article I, 
Section 8 suggests that the phrase “for public use” was intended as a prepositional placeholder 
for the governmental power that must exist for the Takings Clause to have any meaning, namely, 
the power of eminent domain.58 In other words, the original meaning of the Takings Clause 
might be “nor shall private property be taken under the power of eminent domain without just 
compensation.”59 Thus, Article I, Section 8 potentially undermines a premise critical for 
Thomas’ position, namely, that the Public Use Clause is a substantive limitation on government 
action.60 
The word “use” in the provision of Article I, Section 10 that requires that any money 
collected by state import taxes “shall be for the use of the Treasury” could likewise imply that 
the Public Use Clause means the opposite of the view taken by Justice Thomas.  If the framers 
actually had Article I, Section 10 in mind when they chose the word “use” for the Takings 
Clause, then logic suggests that they would have used a parallel formulation if their intent was to 
convey an identically narrow meaning.61 Specifically, just as import tax revenues “shall be for 
the use of the Treasury,” so too, the Takings Clause could have required that taken property 
“shall be for the use of the public.”  This is as plausible as Justice Thomas’ conclusion that “use” 
in Article I, Section 10 mandates a literal reading of the Public Use Clause. 
 
57 Cf. id. at 106–07 (explaining that the substantive limitation in Article I, Section 8 concerns the meaning of the 
words “raise” and “support”). 
58 See Harrington, supra note 45, at 1299 (arguing that the Public Use Clause “was meant to be descriptive, rather 
than prescriptive”).  The term “eminent domain” does not appear in the Constitution, yet the United States clearly 
possesses that power despite the lack of explicit constitutional authorization.  Cf. Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts 63 
(Pa. 1840) (noting that Pennsylvania’s right of eminent domain “would have existed in full force without” the 
constitutional clause that prohibits taking property for public use without just compensation), cited by LEWIS, supra 
note 27, at 22 n.4. 
59 This formulation paraphrases LEWIS, supra note 27, at ii; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
60 Whether the Public Use Clause is in fact such a limitation is discussed above.  See supra notes 44–45 and 
accompanying text. 
61 See Harrington, supra note 45, at 1300–01 (arguing that if Congress had intended the Public Use Clause to be a 
narrow substantive limitation on eminent domain, “it might have gone about the business far more directly”). 
Breau, Thomas’ Kelo Dissent 
Page 10 of 39 
Thomas’ next argument is based on the absence of the word “use” in another clause.  He 
points to the language of the General Welfare Clause, which states that “Congress shall have the 
power to . . . provide for the common defense and general welfare,”62 and suggests that the 
framers would have used “for the general welfare” in the Takings Clause if they intended its 
scope to be as broad.63 However, Thomas’ assumption that “public use” meant something 
substantially different than “general welfare” at the time of the founding may simply be untrue.64 
Rather, early Americans probably equated “public use” with “public benefit” and would not 
likely have drawn the sharp distinction that Thomas suggests.65 Furthermore, even if the General 
Welfare Clause is broader than the Public Use Clause, the literal meaning of “public use” is not 
the only interpretive option.  Despite the Kelo majority’s deference to legislative determinations 
of what constitutes public use, the issue is still subject to substantive judicial review.66 In 
contrast, the general welfare limitation on congressional power is generally considered to be 
effectively nonjusticiable.67 Thus, even if Thomas is correct that the distinct language in these 
two clauses indicates distinct meanings, this does not necessitate the conclusion that the framers 
intended “for public use” to be read as “actual use by the public” rather than as “public benefit, 
 
62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
63 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2679–80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
64 Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Eminent Domain, “Public Use,” and the Conundrum of Original Intent, 36 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 59, 74–75 (1996); Nathan Alexander Sales, Note, Classical Republicanism and the Fifth 
Amendment's “Public Use” Requirement, 49 DUKE L.J. 339, 340–41 & nn.10–12 (1999). 
65 Melton, supra note 64, at 84–85. 
66 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that “the question what is a public use is a judicial 
one” (quoting Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930)). 
67 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 n.2 (1987); see also Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the 
Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 197 (2001) (describing the General Welfare Clause as “effectively 
nonjusticiable”); David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Analysis 
of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1197, 1200 (2004) (“Dole’s 
requirement that spending programs serve the ‘general welfare’ is, by the Court’s own admission, nonjusticiable.”); 
Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About Conditional 
Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 161 (2004) (“There is no justiciable limit on the expenditure of 
funds . . . for ‘the general welfare.’”).  But see David L. Breau, Note, A New Take on Public Use: Were Kelo and 
Lingle Nonjusticiable?, 55 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Feb. 2006) (arguing that the Berman-Midkiff-Kelo line of cases 
has rendered the Public Use Clause effectively nonjusticiable). 
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utility, or advantage,” since the latter standard is still substantively distinct from the standard that 
governs judicial review in the General Welfare Clause context. 
Thomas’ final argument from “context” compares the phrase “public use” in the federal 
Constitution with the phrase “public exigencies” in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights68 
and the Northwest Ordinance, and the phrase “public necessity” in the Vermont Constitution of 
1786, and suggests that the words “public use” in the federal constitution indicate a greater 
curtailment of eminent domain than existed under these other constitutional documents.69 
However, a closer examination of the Takings Clauses in these three documents reveals that the 
comparison is at best inconclusive and at worst disproves Thomas’ argument. 
Both the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, adopted in 1780, and the Vermont 
Constitution of 1786 actually speak of “public uses” in a manner that precisely parallels the 
language in the federal Takings Clause.  The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights states that 
“whenever the public exigencies require, that the property of any individual should be 
appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.”70 The 
Vermont Constitution of 1786 states the general principle that “private property ought to be 
subservient to public uses, when necessity requires it” and then specifically provides that, despite 
this subservience, “whenever any particular man’s property is taken for the use of the public, the 
owner ought to receive an equivalent in money.”71 The Fifth Amendment reference to property 
“taken for public use” parallels the Massachusetts reference to property “appropriated for public 
 
68 Justice Thomas refers to this document as the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, but its full title is “A Declaration of 
the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.”  In this paper, I use “Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights” because it is consistent with the original title of that document.  1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 337 (1971). 
69 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
70 MASS. CONST. art. X (1780), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 341 (emphasis added). 
71 VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. II (1786), reprinted in 6 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 3752 (1909) (emphasis added). 
Breau, Thomas’ Kelo Dissent 
Page 12 of 39 
uses” and the Vermont reference to property “taken for the use of the public.”  Thomas, 
however, bases his argument on a comparison between non-parallel clauses.   
These state forerunners to the federal Takings Clause also seem to suggest that “public 
exigencies” or “necessity” must be a condition precedent to the exercise of eminent domain, in 
addition to requiring that taken property be for public use.72 Thus, it could be that the omission 
of the “public exigencies” and “necessity” requirements from the federal Takings Clause 
indicates that the federal Public Use Clause is less restrictive than the limitations in the Takings 
Clauses of colonial Massachusetts and Vermont.73 
The Northwest Ordinance was adopted by the Continental Congress in 1787 and “was 
framed mainly from the laws of Massachusetts.”74 Its Takings Clause, which seems to be 
broader than the federal Takings Clause with respect to public use, provides that “should the 
public exigencies make it necessary for the common preservation to take any person’s property, 
or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same.”75 Similar to 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the Northwest Ordinance refers to “public exigencies,” 
apparently as a condition precedent for taking private property.  Unlike both the federal Takings 
Clause and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which refer to property taken for “public 
use” or “public uses,” the Northwest Ordinance does not specify what is to be done with property 
 
72 Sales, supra note 64, at 367–68. 
73 Id. at 368, cited by Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Thomas’ citation of Sales is misleading 
because Sales actually argues that the linguistic distinctions between these documents indicate that the public use 
limitation in the federal Constitution is less restrictive than the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the Vermont 
Constitution, and the Northwest Ordinance.  Sales, supra note 64, at 368; see also infra text accompanying notes 
136–137. 
James Madison’s original draft of what would become the Takings Clause read “no person shall be . . . 
obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just compensation.”  2 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 1027.  If Thomas is correct that the House Committee responsible for reviewing 
Madison’s draft had these early state documents in mind, the deletion of any reference to “necessity” would suggest 
that the House intended to broaden the amendment relative to the Takings Clauses of Massachusetts and Vermont. 
74 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 386–87 (quoting an 1830 letter of Nathan Dane, who drafted the Northwest 
Ordinance that was adopted by the Continental Congress). 
75 Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-west of the River Ohio, art. II (July 13, 
1787), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 400. 
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after it has been taken.  In other words, the Northwest Ordinance simply does not contain a 
clause that parallels the federal Public Use Clause.  Thus, although the addition of the words “for 
public use” to the Fifth Amendment suggests that the drafters intended some additional 
limitation on eminent domain, any conclusion from a comparison with the Northwest Ordinance 
about the extent of that additional limitation is little more than speculation.76 And as explained 
above, a comparison with the other two pre-1791 Takings Clauses suggests that the federal 
public use limitation is less restrictive than the equivalent clauses in either of those documents. 
II. “THE CONSTITUTION’S COMMON-LAW BACKGROUND”
Thomas surveys “the Constitution’s common-law background” to buttress the 
conclusions of his textual analysis that the Fifth Amendment requires the public to actually use 
taken property.77 This “common-law background” is almost entirely drawn from Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, and for Thomas it is nearly axiomatic that the framers intended the Takings 
Clause to be the constitutional embodiment of “‘the law of the land [that] postpone[s] even 
public necessity to the sacred and inviolable rights of private property.’”78 Although the framers 
were undoubtedly influenced by theories about absolute property rights,79 elevating such theories 
to constitutional status was not their sole motivation.80 In fact, some scholars have gone so far as 
to call the “American liberal tradition” little more than a myth.81 While this probably 
 
76 The Northwest Ordinance requires some public exigency to exist before a taking of property but does not state 
that property, once taken, shall be put to public use.  Conversely, the federal Takings Clause does not indicate that 
some public exigency must exist before property can be taken, but does say that such property is “taken for public 
use.”  Although one requirement logically implies the other, a comparison of the precise phraseology used in these 
documents inconclusive. 
77 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
78 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 134–35 
(1765)). 
79 SCHULTZ, supra note 15, at 19. 
80 Id. at 12–16. 
81 See, e.g., NOVAK, supra note 23, at 2–3, 6–8 (1996); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF 
FREEDOM 7–8 (1956); Scheiber, supra note 22, at 218; cf. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS 
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 224 (1990) (discussing the “complex, paradoxical, and mythical dimensions of 
property’s importance in American constitutionalism”). 
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exaggerates its insignificance, there were other intellectual traditions that the framers inherited, 
and “a thinker of the time could even be attracted simultaneously to contradictory or even 
mutually exclusive concepts.”82 
One of the most influential of these concepts was civic republicanism—“the idea that 
private ‘interests’ could and should be subordinated to the common welfare of the polity.”83 
According to republican ideology, which stemmed from James Harrington’s 1656 treatise 
Oceana,84 the objective of government was to protect “the political liberty of the collective 
people”—republicans were less concerned with protecting individual liberty against collective 
encroachment than with protecting “the public rights of the people against aristocratic privileges 
and power.”85 Unlike Blackstone, Harrington advocated protecting individual liberty by 
redistributing property to ensure the survival of a republican form of government.86 A citizen 
who owned private property was freed from the burden of providing for his own personal 
welfare and could instead pursue the civic virtue of pursuing the common welfare.87 Although 
the influence of republican thought waned after the turn of the nineteenth century,88 James Kent 
was still able to observe in 1826 that the “[p]rivate interest must be made subservient to the 
general interest of the community.”89 
82 SCHULTZ, supra note 15, at 12 (citation omitted). 
83 ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 29. 
84 SCHULTZ, supra note 15, at 16–17. 
85 ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 29. 
86 SCHULTZ, supra note 15, at 17. 
87 ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 29. 
88 Cf. HORWITZ, supra note 26, at 64 (noting that as late as 1800, “there still existed a perhaps dominant body of 
opinion maintaining that individuals held their property at the sufferance of the state”). 
89 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 265 (1826), quoted by NOVAK, supra note 23, at 9.  Although 
Kent’s views on the role of private property were influenced by Federalists such as Alexander Hamilton and John 
Jay, his “formative years were spent in the revolutionary and constitutional periods when the political language of 
civic republicanism provided common vocabulary that crossed party lines.”  ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 134–35. 
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Many of the founders did not consider the public good to be in direct conflict with private 
interests but rather understood them to mutually reinforce one another.90 Blackstone himself 
understood this interrelationship between the public good and private interests, noting that “the 
public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual’s 
private rights.”91 Furthermore, Blackstone may not have held the views that are now commonly 
attributed to him,92 and the language from the Commentaries quoted by Thomas is taken out of 
context.93 For Blackstone, the “great . . . regard of the law for private property” meant that it 
would “not authorize the least violation of it” by the Crown.94 But the legislature’s authority to 
take private property was clear—“the legislature alone, can, and indeed frequently does, 
interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce” to the public good.95 The way the legislature 
could “compel the individual” was “by giving him full indemnification” such that “[t]he public is 
now considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange.”96 However, this 
 
90 ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 26–30. 
91 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at 135. 
92 See, e.g., NOVAK, supra note 23, at 32 (noting that nineteenth-century jurists conception of Blackstone was that 
“the individual and his interests preceded and trumped society and social interests”). 
93 “So great . . . is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not 
even for the general good of the whole community. . . . If a new road . . . were to be made through the grounds of a 
private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to 
do this without consent of the owner of the land.”  Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2680 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, 
at 135). 
94 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at 135 (describing eminent domain as “an exertion of power, . . . which 
nothing but the legislature can perform”).  John Locke, like Blackstone, was more concerned about arbitrary 
confiscations of private property by kings than by legislatures, and suggested that government by the people’s 
representatives would guard against such abuses.  Locke explained that such arbitrary takings of property are  
not much to be feared in governments where the legislative consists . . . in assemblies which are 
variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of the assembly, are subjects under the common 
laws of their country, equally with the rest. But in governments, where the legislative is in one 
lasting assembly always in being, or in one man, as in absolute monarchies, there is danger still, 
that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community; and so 
will be apt to increase their own riches and power, by taking what they think fit from the people. 
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 140 (1690); see also id. § 140 (noting that government can only 
take property “with his [the owner’s] own consent—i.e., the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves 
or their representatives chosen by them”). 
95 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at 135. 
96 Id. 
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analogy to private transactions does not suggest an “actual use” limitation as Thomas implies,97 
and Blackstone immediately clarifies his understanding of the legislature’s eminent domain 
authority.  “All that the legislature does,” Blackstone writes, “is to oblige the owner to alienate 
his possessions for a reasonable price.”98 If Blackstone can be read to suggest a public use 
limitation at all, it is more in tune with the Kelo majority than with Thomas’ dissent.  
Blackstone’s discussion of the legislature’s power to take private property does not even mention 
“public use,” but instead refers to takings that are “extensively beneficial to the public” or for the 
“common good” or “the public good.”99 
Legislative eminent domain authority did not contradict Blackstone’s “absolute” private 
property rights because Blackstone, like the American republicans, believed that property rights 
were at least partly a creation of society.100 “The original of private property is probably 
founded in nature, . . . but certainly the modifications under which we at present find it . . . are 
entirely derived from society; and are some of those civil advantages, in exchange for which 
every individual has resigned a part of his natural liberty.”101 For Blackstone, and probably for 
the framers as well, “absolute” private property rights had an altogether different meaning than is 
commonly supposed.102 
97 Compare id. at 135 (“But how does [the legislature] interpose and compel?  Not by absolutely stripping the 
subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury 
thereby sustained.  The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange.”), 
with Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Only ‘by giving [the landowner] full indemnification” could 
the government take property, and even then “[t]he public [was] now considered as an individual, treating with an 
individual for an exchange.” (alterations in original)). 
98 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at 135. 
99 Id. 
100 ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 27; SCHULTZ, supra note 15, at 19. 
101 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at 134. 
102 See SCHULTZ, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that although Blackstone describes property rights as absolute, “this . . 
. is tempered by ‘the laws of the land’ and subject to legal restrictions (which are numerous)”). 
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Regardless of whether Blackstone actually viewed private property rights as so sacred 
that they could not be violated “even for the general good of the whole community,”103 Thomas 
provides no indication of the extent that such ideas played a role in the drafting of the Takings 
Clause, and he completely ignores members of the founding generation that emphatically 
disagreed with any absolute conception of property rights.104 For example, James Wilson, who 
was a delegate at the Constitutional Convention105 and a Supreme Court Justice from 1789 until 
his death in 1798, believed that property rights were both social and relative, rather than 
individual and absolute, and criticized the Lockean “selfish philosophy” of absolute individual 
rights.106 According to Wilson, individual rights would be better secured by preserving the 
common welfare of the entire polity to ensure the survival of a republican government,107 and 
Wilson and other early American judges and legal thinkers108 actively developed a theory of 
 
103 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2680 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at 135).  But see NOVAK, supra note 23, at 264 
n.62 (noting that “Blackstone often substantially qualified his bold generalizations on rights by the time he finished 
his more substantive, doctrinal discussions”); Harrington, supra note 45, at 1267–68 & nn.80–81 (noting that both 
Blackstone and Locke recognized that some takings occurred without compensation). 
104 Thomas is probably correct that Blackstone’s ideas influenced early state eminent domain practices, but that 
influence was largely manifested by the gradual adoption by the states of a compensation requirement.  See 
HORWITZ, supra note 26, at 63–65.  As late as 1820, a majority of the original colonies had not yet added 
compensation requirements to their state constitutions.  Id. at 64.  But as the nineteenth century progressed, the 
influence of “Blackstone’s strict views about the necessity of providing compensation” led states to gradually adopt 
constitutional and statutory provisions requiring compensation for takings of property.  Id. at 63–65.  For example, 
James Kent quoted extensively from Blackstone in his opinion in Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns Ch. 162 
(N.Y. Ch. 1816), in order to emphasize the importance of compensation as a means of protecting individuals against 
arbitrary takings of private property. 
105 H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS 45, 49 (2002). 
106 NOVAK, supra note 23, at 30–31, 36.  Wilson analyzed the Constitution by beginning with its broad goals and 
only then proceeding to specific rules, in contrast with “modern attempts to construct a general politics of 
philosophy from particular, enumerated powers or the Bill of Rights.”  Id. at 268 n.118. 
107 Id. at 34. 
108 Another early jurist who combined Blackstone’s ideas about the necessity of compensation with republican ideals 
about the supremacy of the common welfare was Justice William Patterson.  In a 1795 Circuit Court opinion, Justice 
Patterson agreed with Blackstone that “[t]he preservation of property . . . is a primary object of the social compact.”  
Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).  But he unequivocally qualified that 
statement with the admonition that “[e]very person ought to contribute his proportion for public purposes and public 
exigencies” with the added qualification that “no one can be called upon to surrender or sacrifice his whole property, 
real and personal, for the good of the community, without receiving a recompense in value.”  Id. Justice Patterson’s 
opinion in Vanhorne’s Lessee is discussed more fully in Part IV, infra.
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public rights in accordance with the common-law principle of salus populi suprema lex est —the 
“the welfare of the people is the supreme law.”109 
The principle of salus populi formed the basis of what William Novak calls the 
“well-regulated society,” in which “the rights of individuals were not protected absolutely, 
according to . . . unchanging, natural laws of economic or individual behavior.”110 Similarly, 
Harry Scheiber has demonstrated that in antebellum America, 
judges gave a good deal of sustained attention to producing a theory of 
“public rights” (trenching seriously on private claims to property), and 
the law was responsive to the imperatives of that theory in balancing off 
claims of the public good against constitutional mandates for the 
protection of private “vested” rights.111 
Thomas’ Kelo dissent does not mention Justice Wilson.  Instead, to support his assertion that the 
Public Use Clause is an embodiment of absolute private property rights, Thomas cites Justice 
Chase’s Calder v. Bull112 well-known dictum that “a law that takes property from A. and gives it 
to B.” is obviously invalid.113 But the prevalence of republican ideas among the founding 
generation114 undermines the assumption that the original meaning of the Takings Clause is 
solely represented by the Blackstonian views of Justice Chase115 rather than by the Harringtonian 
views of Justice Wilson.116 
109 NOVAK, supra note 23, at 9, 30–35, 41–42. 
110 Id. at 35–36 (emphasis added). 
111 Scheiber, supra note 22, at 219. 
112 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
113 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388, cited by Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  This dicta has been 
cited as a rhetorical flourish by all sides in the public use debate.  Breau, supra note 67, at n.93.  Less often noted is 
that Justice Chase went on to note that the legislature could authorize a taking of private property only “for the 
benefit of the whole community, and on making full satisfaction.” Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 392 (emphasis added); 
see also infra note 223. 
114 ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 26–36; see supra note 108; see also supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text. 
115 As noted above, it is questionable whether Blackstone would actually with today’s Blackstonians.  See supra 
notes 92–102 and accompanying text. 
116 See, e.g., SCHULTZ, supra note 15, at 25 (noting that although eminent domain was a well-recognized 
governmental power by 1787, “just compensation was not a widely accepted practice, despite the fact that 
Blackstone . . . [had] endorsed this concept”). 
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III. EARLY STATE PRACTICES 
An examination of the eminent domain practices of the states during the first half-century 
after the founding can provide insight into how the eminent domain authority of the states was 
limited by the Takings Clauses in state constitutions.117 Because many state Takings Clauses 
contain language similar to the federal Takings Clause, such early practices can indicate how the 
founding generation viewed the federal Takings Clause as a limit on governmental authority.118 
Thomas’ survey of early state practices leads him to conclude that those practices conformed 
with his narrow conception of public use.  But the historical record is less conclusive than 
Thomas’ dissent suggests. 
One well-known early exercise of eminent domain by the states was the passage of Mill 
Acts.119 Mills operated by harnessing the power generated by falling water, and dams were 
required in order to raise the water level.  Such dams often permanently flooded neighbors’ 
upstream lands,120 and the Mill Acts allowed mill-owners to construct dams and prevented the 
owners of flooded land from obtaining injunctive or monetary relief for trespass or nuisance 
through the courts.121 During the eighteenth century, most mills were either grist mills or saw 
mills, but advances in technology during the nineteenth century enabled the construction of 
cotton mills,122 ironworks,123 and other manufacturing operations that required mechanical 
power.  The Mill Acts often, though not always, provided for statutory procedures to enable 
 
117 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2681 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  See generally NOVAK, supra note 23 (providing examples of 
state regulation, confiscation, and destruction of private property in antebellum America to demonstrate the extent 
that the public welfare took precedence over private property rights). 
118 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2681 (Thomas, J., dissenting); HORWITZ, supra note 26, at 48; SCHULTZ, supra note 15, at 26. 
119 SCHULTZ, supra note 15, at 26. 
120 Id. 
121 HORWITZ, supra note 26, at 48. 
122 Id. at 50. 
123 LEWIS, supra note 27, at 248. 
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upstream owners to obtain compensation, but mill owners could sometimes avoid liability by 
showing that the flooding resulted in a net benefit to the owner of flooded land.124 
Thomas argues in his Kelo dissent that these early Mill Acts enabled a taking of private 
property that was for actual use by the public because the earliest mills were “compelled to serve 
the public for a stipulated toll.”125 Thomas also notes the objects of other early exercises of 
eminent domain that in his view support the “actual use” standard, such as “public roads, toll 
roads, ferries, canals, railroads, and public parks.”126 Putting aside historical inaccuracies for a 
moment,127 Thomas’ characterization of the Mill Acts could actually support the constitutionality 
of the takings challenged in Kelo, even under his “actual use” standard.  Regardless of whether 
early mills were actually used by the public,128 the flooded lands were certainly not.  The taking 
of land by flooding certainly benefited the public by enabling the construction mills that the 
public could use, but contrary to Thomas’ implication, the public did not actually use the flooded 
land.  Rather, the public used the mills, and the mills in turn could operate because upstream land 
had been flooded. 
This distinction is admittedly too clever by half, but the point is that if the land taken 
under the Mill Acts is considered to have been actually used by the public, as Thomas suggests, 
then the taking in Kelo easily qualifies as a public use as well.  Thomas’ reasoning suggests that 
when a merchant is authorized by the government to take private property in order to construct a 
facility that provides a service for a fee to the public, the public actually uses the taken 
 
124 HORWITZ, supra note 26, at 48; LEWIS, supra note 27, at 255–60; SCHULTZ, supra note 15, at 26–27. 
125 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2681 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting LEWIS, supra note 27, at 246). 
126 Id. (quoting LEWIS, supra note 27, at 246). 
127 For example, in one earliest cases concerning the constitutionality of a Mill Act, the public had no legal right to 
use the millworks at issue.  Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467, 476–77 (1832); see 
also infra notes 156–159 and accompanying text. 
128 Thomas is not clear whether he would require actual use by the public or merely that the public have a legal right 
to use the taken property.  See supra note 21. 
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property.129 The property at issue in Kelo was to be used “to support the adjacent state park, by 
providing parking or retail services to visitors, or to support the nearby marina” and to build “at 
least 90,000 square feet of research and development office space.”130 These uses easily satisfy 
Thomas’ test.  Members of the public will actually use the parking facilities that are provided for 
visitors to the state park.  Retail stores are also public uses by any definition—the 1888 treatise 
that Thomas relies on for much of the historical data in his dissent states that “[p]roperty taken 
for public buildings of all kinds, such as . . . markets . . . and the like, is taken for public use.”131 
Thomas, however, omits “markets” from his list of public uses cited from this treatise.132 
Another particularly relevant omission from the list of public uses catalogued by Lewis in 
1888 is what he calls “improving navigation,”133 which includes taking land “on the banks of 
navigable streams for public landing places,”134 or, in modern parlance, a marina.  If the Kelo 
plaintiffs’ property is to provide parking or warehouse space for the nearby marina, that is a 
public use according to Thomas’ definition.  Furthermore, even if members of the public do not 
directly use the taken property when they avail themselves of the marina’s services, Thomas’ 
public use test is satisfied as per his characterization of the Mill Acts.135 To be sure, early mills 
could not operate without being able to flood upstream lands, whereas marina or park “support” 
may not be strictly necessary for those facilities to operate.  But Thomas’ own textual analysis 
mitigates against a strict necessity requirement.  That textual analysis includes a comparison of 
 
129 The mills charged a fee to anyone who wished to use their facilities.  LEWIS, supra note 27, at 246 n.3. 
130 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659–60.  The entire redevelopment plan used 90 acres of land divided into seven parcels, and 
the plaintiffs’ properties were situated on just two of these parcels, and the plan specified these uses for those 
parcels.  Id. Owners of property on the other parcels had voluntarily sold their land to the city.  Id. at 2660. 
131 LEWIS, supra note 27, at 242 (footnotes omitted); see also NOVAK, supra note 23, at 95–105 (explaining the 
extent of governmental control over urban markets—i.e., “that place near the center of town where farmers, 
butchers, and householders exchanged necessary provisions”—during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). 
132 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2681 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing LEWIS, supra note 27, at 227–28, 234–41, 243); see also 
supra text accompanying note 126. 
133 LEWIS, supra note 27, at 244–45. 
134 Id. 
135 See supra notes 125–129 and accompanying text. 
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the federal Public Use Clause to equivalent restrictions in three other pre-1791 founding 
documents.136 As is explained above, those three Takings Clauses require that a taking of 
property be because of some “public exigency” or “public necessity,” in addition to requiring 
that the taken property be for a public use.137 Accordingly, Thomas should consider it significant 
that the federal Takings Clause lacks an equivalent requirement, and, to be consistent, should 
hold that using the property taken from the Kelo plaintiffs for park or marina support satisfies the 
federal public use requirement even if that property is not strictly necessary for the operation of 
those facilities. 
Office space is also actually used by the public.  Any member of the public that is willing 
and able to lease the space may presumably do so, just as any member of the public who was 
able to pay the price to use a mill could do so.138 Admittedly, the “public” character of property 
taken for office space seems qualitatively different than that of property taken under the Mill 
Acts, if only because of the significant difference in the length of time of each individual’s use—
the term of an office lease is measured in years while the use of a mill is probably takes hours or 
days.  But such a normative distinction presumably would be irrelevant when considering the 
“original meaning” of the Public Use Clause.  Rather, the taking is constitutional as long as the 
public “a legal right to use the property,”139 which would seem to be the case here.140 Regardless 
of whether the takings in Kelo satisfy an “actual use” standard, Thomas’ assertion that the early 
Mill Acts “compelled” mills to serve the public is historically inaccurate.  In the eighteenth 
 
136 These documents are the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780, the Vermont Constitution of 1786, and 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.  Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
137 See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.  The Northwest Ordinance actually does not contain a public use 
limitation at all.  See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
138 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
139 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  However, whether Thomas requires “legal” use or “actual” use 
is not clear from his opinion.  See supra note 21. 
140 See infra note 163. 
Breau, Thomas’ Kelo Dissent 
Page 23 of 39 
century, most mills were for grinding grain and were “understood to be open to the public,”141 
though whether they were “compelled” to serve the public is less certain.142 Furthermore, 
although the mills were used by the public, the flooded land was not, and if the correct legal 
standard is that the public has “a legal right to use the property,”143 equating use of the mills to 
use of the flooded land seems to be an inappropriate extension.144 
Beginning in the early nineteenth century, the Mill Acts were extended to “saw, paper, 
and cotton mills, many of which served only the proprietor,”145 and as early as 1814, the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts found such a broad Mill Act constitutional.146 Thomas, 
however, dismisses such “later extension[s]” as “not deeply probative” of whether early state 
practice was consistent with the original meaning of the Public Use Clause,147 even though 
virtually no cases on the meaning of “public use” were decided before 1814.  In fact, seven of the 
nine cases Thomas cites as examples of courts that “adhered to the natural meaning of ‘public 
use’” were decided after 1870,148 by which time the republican ideas that were prevalent at the 
time of the founding were already being supplanted with “new political voices and new legal 
languages”149 that emphasized the dichotomy and conflict between the public good and private 
interest.150 
141 HORWITZ, supra note 26, at 49. 
142 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2681 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing LEWIS, supra note 27, at 246 & n.3).  The section in 
Lewis that Thomas cites provides a short description of early Mill Acts in fifteen states.  Although all fifteen states 
regulated the prices charged by millers to some extent, Lewis mentions that just five of those states—Alabama, 
Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, and North Carolina—actually required millers to grind for the public, and Alabama 
and Connecticut appear to have adopted these requirements after 1791.  LEWIS, supra note 27, at 246 n.3. 
143 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
144 See supra notes 129–139 and accompanying text. 
145 HORWITZ, supra note 26, at 49. 
146 Stowell v. Flagg, 11 Mass. 364, 368 (1814), discussed by HORWITZ, supra note 26, at 49. 
147 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2682 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
148 Id. at 2682 n.2.  These seven cases were decided in 1871, 1877, 1883, 1903, 1906, 1907, and 1908.  Id. 
149 NOVAK, supra note 23, at 240. 
150 Id. at 239–48. 
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Of the remaining two cases Thomas cites, one is an 1859 Alabama decision that was 
limited to holding that “purely private” roads and mills were not public uses,151 but the case does 
not go so far as to hold that “public use” always requires actual use by the public.152 The second 
case—the earliest that Thomas cites as exemplary of early state practice—is Harding v. 
Goodlett,153 an 1832 Tennessee case that, like the 1859 Alabama decision, turns more on the 
interpretation of the particular statute at issue than on the proper interpretation of Tennessee’s 
Public Use Clause.154 Notably, Thomas makes no mention of two other 1832 cases that both 
directly addressed the meaning of public use.155 In Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman,156 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the construction of dams necessary for the 
operation of “grist-mills, iron manufactories, and other mills for other useful purposes” satisfied 
the Massachusetts Public Use Clause.157 Even though the public had no legal right to use the 
manufacturing operations, the court was “at a loss to imagine any [private] undertaking . . . in 
which the public had a more certain and direct interest and benefit.”158 
Take the grist-mill established in this city, as an example.  Is it of no 
benefit to have the corn ground near to the inhabitants, rather than at a 
distance?  “But you cannot compel the miller to grind your corn for the 
toll, as you may the proprietors of the turnpike to let you travel over the 
 
151 Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 332–34 (1859), cited by Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2682 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
152 See LEWIS, supra note 27, at 229 & n.2 (characterizing Sadler as holding that “when [a] road, after being laid out, 
becomes the property of the applicant, from which he may lawfully exclude the public, then the use is strictly private 
and the law authorizing the condemnation of property therefor is void”); id. at 284 & n.2 (characterizing Sadler as 
holding that “in a state where the only kind of mills regarded as a public use are public grist-mills, a statute which 
authorized the condemnation of property for the erection of a ‘mill or other machinery’ was . . . void”). 
153 11 Tenn. (3 Yerg.) 41 (1832), cited by Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2682 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
154 Harding, 11 Tenn. at 52–54; see also LEWIS, supra note 27, at 250 & n.3 (noting that the decision in Harding 
was that “under an act which related solely to grist-mills, an application for a grist-mill, saw-mill and paper-mill 
could not be granted”).  Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the Harding court described the public use 
requirement in broad terms: “It is only for public uses the state is authorized to exercise [its eminent domain power] 
. . . because the interests of the community require that for the good of the whole, the private right must be yielded.”  
11 Tenn. (3 Yerg.) at 52. 
155 The 1888 treatise that Thomas relies on for much of his historical information discusses the Tennessee case 
almost as an afterthought after first discussion of these two other 1832 cases.  LEWIS, supra note 27, at 247–50. 
156 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467 (1832). 
157 Id. at 476. 
158 Id., quoted by LEWIS, supra note 27, at 248. 
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road for a toll.”  If there be not an actual, there is a moral necessity 
imposed upon the owner of the mill, to accommodate the public to the 
extent of his power.  Who ever heard of a refusal?159 
The other important 1832 public use case that goes unmentioned in Thomas’ dissent is 
Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co.160 In Scudder, the New Jersey Court of Chancery upheld 
the application of a Mill Act to private manufacturing mills because it considered the public use 
limitation to be satisfied by the economic benefit that would result from the mills’ “stimulus to 
industry of every kind.”161 
It is unsurprising that Thomas does not discuss Boston & Roxbury Mill or Scudder—
these courts’ understanding of public use almost directly contradicts Thomas’ assertion in Kelo 
that a “promise of new jobs and increased tax revenue” was not consistent Public Use Clause’s 
original meaning.162 In 1832, the Boston & Roxbury Mill court emphatically approved job 
creation as a valid public use: 
[I]n regard to the manufacturing establishments, is it nothing to the 
public that great numbers of citizens have the means of employment 
brought to their homes?  And are not the proprietors obliged to give 
employment?  They cannot carry their works on without labor, and who 
that is disposed to industry and to that kind of employment, is prevented 
from its exercise? . . . . [T]he interest or benefit arising from 
manufacturing establishments is distributed quite as much, and 
oftentimes more, among the laborers and operatives, than among the 
proprietors of the works.163 
159 Id. at 477, quoted by LEWIS, supra note 27, at 248. 
160 1 N.J. Eq. 694 (N.J. Ch. 1832).  Scudder has been described as “the first significant public use challenge” to a 
state act authorizing the flooding of private property for industrial mills.  Meidinger, supra note 45, at 23.  
Incidentally, the plaintiffs in Scudder sought relief in equity because New Jersey had no just compensation 
requirement until 1844.  LEWIS, supra note 27, at 35–36. 
161 Scudder, 1 N.J. Eq. at 729. 
162 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677–78 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
163 Boston & Roxbury Mill Co., 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) at 477.  In Kelo, the firms that will occupy the 90,000 square 
feet of research and development office space presumably “cannot carry their works on without labor,” id. at 477, 
which suggests that office space is a use that is consistent with the public use requirement under Boston & Roxbury 
Mill. Since Thomas provides no citation to an earlier case, Boston & Roxbury Mill is at least as good an indicator of 
the original meaning of the Public Use Clause as any of the cases he cites to support his understanding of the states’ 
early eminent domain practices. 
Breau, Thomas’ Kelo Dissent 
Page 26 of 39 
Although neither court addressed increasing tax revenue as a valid public use, the Scudder court 
came close when it explicitly categorized “increase[ing] the value of property” as a legitimate 
public use.164 Thomas simply misconstrues history when he asserts that early state practice 
generally conformed to the actual use standard.  In fact, one scholar has noted that “the first . . . 
articulation of the narrow construction of public use” by a state court was not until 1837.165 
Before that, the few courts that discussed public use interpreted that clause broadly, and many 
courts were more than willing to allow takings for the purpose of economic development.166 
Thomas begins his dissent by accusing the Kelo majority of replacing the Public Use 
Clause with a “‘Diverse and Always Evolving Needs of Society’ Clause.”167 But the original 
meaning of the Public Use Clause may be closer to that derisive characterization than one might 
gather from Thomas’ opinion.  In 1832, a New Jersey court considered such “evolving needs of 
society” to be a part of the public use analysis: 
The ever varying condition of society is constantly presenting new 
objects of public importance and utility; and what shall be considered a 
public use or benefit, may depend somewhat on the situation and wants 
of the community for the time being.168 
Thomas suggests that these early cases were anomalies, in which “state legislatures tested the 
limits of their state-law eminent domain power,” and he criticizes the majority for citing such 
 
164 Scudder, 1 N.J. Eq. at 729. 
165 SCHULTZ, supra note 15, at 76 (discussing Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 2 (1837)). 
166 Id. at 75–76.  For example, in the earliest federal public use decision that this author was able to locate, the 
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia considered a public use challenge to a statute that delegated eminent 
domain authority to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad—a private corporation—to allow it to extend its lines into the 
District of Columbia. Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Van Ness, 2 F. Cas. 574 (C.C.D.D.C. 1835).  The court rejected the 
challenge because  
this railroad, although it may be profitable to the stockholders, is also a great public benefit. It 
does not prevent the public from enjoying all the advantages which they enjoyed before, and gives 
them a cheaper, safer, and more expeditious mode of traveling than they would otherwise have.  If 
it may not be called a common highway, yet it is really a common good. It is a great public 
convenience. . . . The condemnation of land, for such purposes, has been so general, and so 
extensive, for many years, that it may well be considered as established by the law of the land. . . . 
The condemnation of the land, therefore, is clearly for the . . . public use . . . . 
Id. at 576 (emphasis added). 
167 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662). 
168 Scudder, 1 N.J. Eq. at 729 (emphasis added). 
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cases as “evidence of the broad ‘public purpose’ interpretation of the Public Use Clause.”169 
Thomas concedes, however, that the meaning of “public use” was a “hotly contested question in 
state courts” during the nineteenth century,170 and while the majority relies on a century of 
federal Supreme Court precedent when it chooses to read the Public Use Clause broadly,171 
Thomas falls back on his textual analysis, praising the early decisions that “adhered to the natural 
meaning of ‘public use.’”172 However, as is demonstrated above,173 a textual analysis of the 
Public Use Clause is just as inconclusive as the early state decisions about the clause’s original 
meaning, all of which led John Lewis to observe in his 1888 treatise that “[i]f we look to our 
dictionaries, we find the same confusion as in the decisions.”174 
The original meaning that Justice Thomas attributes to the Public Use Clause is in fact 
just one of several plausible original understandings of the clause that finds support in history.175 
Running through Thomas’ Kelo dissent is the widely-held assumption that the founders’ primary 
goal in creating the constitution was to protect individuals’ absolute property rights against 
government interference.176 But many founders subscribed to republican ideals, which 
emphasized the elevation of the public good over the private interest as critical to the survival of 
the republican form of government.177 Readers of Thomas’ Kelo dissent ought to keep in mind 
Harry Scheiber’s advice about relying too heavily on historical analysis for guidance in modern 
takings jurisprudence: 
If we want to measure contemporary jurisprudential “takings” doctrine 
against the values of the past or the historical record of law in action, we 
 
169 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2682 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 2662–64. 
172 Id. at 2682 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
173 See supra Part I. 
174 LEWIS, supra note 27, at 223. 
175 See generally Scheiber, supra note 22. 
176 See supra Part II. 
177 See supra notes 83–90, & 108 and accompanying text. 
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need to recognize that our law has been dualistic and has worked in a 
variety of ways—often bewilderingly so.  Historically, American 
property law has expressed no single orthodoxy of either doctrine or 
economic preferences.178 
Because Thomas’ search for the original meaning of the Public Use Clause discounts or ignores 
all but one of the prominent political beliefs held by the founders, his conclusions about the 
clause’s original meaning are at best embarrassingly inaccurate179 and at worst purposefully 
misleading.180 
IV. SEPARATING THE WHEAT FROM THE CHAFF 
Originalism is a time-consuming endeavor.  Sifting through primary and secondary 
sources to accurately ascertain a constitutional provision’s original meaning takes many hours of 
research, and it may be unrealistic to expect the justices and their clerks to do this on the Court’s 
schedule.  To write this article, the author conducted about two months of research.  Although 
the Court’s caseload has diminished in recent years,181 the justices and their clerks may simply 
not have the time to devote several months to researching the history of a single constitutional 
provision.  During the term that Kelo was decided, the Court decided 80 cases, and Justice 
Thomas personally authored 34 opinions, more than any other justice that term.182 The justices’ 
law clerks are also quite busy—they deal with thousands of petitions for certiorari each term, 
 
178 Scheiber, supra note 22, at 232. 
179 Cf. id. at 217 (surmising that those who advocate minimal government intervention, such as Richard Epstein, 
“largely block history out of their analyses of property rights and takings” because “the historical facts regarding 
eminent domain in national and state constitutional law would prove seriously embarrassing”). 
180 See id. at 218 (noting that “little in the actual [historical] record . . . that will throw even a flimsy mantle of 
historical legitimacy over [the] views” of the those who argue that “the pervasive concern of the framers [was] to 
protect private rights”); cf. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 7 (criticizing Justice Scalia for “engaging in historical 
pretensions” in his opinion for the Court in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), in which Scalia 
“relied on the supposed existence of a singular American tradition concerning the protection of private property”). 
181 See Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1369 (2004) (discussing the gradual decline in the Supreme Court’s caseload from 1926 to 
2004).  One reason the Court’s diminishing caseload may not result in more time for the justices and their clerks is 
the dramatic increase in the number of amicus briefs filed in Supreme Court cases during the last several decades.  
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 743, 751–56 (2000). 
182 The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 420 tbl.I (2005). 
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draft bench memos on a daily basis, review emergency requests to stay state executions, and 
research and write drafts of opinions.183 Such a schedule means that most historical research 
conducted by the justices or their clerks is probably limited to the information provided to the 
Court in briefs submitted by the litigants and amici. 
Briefs submitted by amici are likely to be the primary of historical information presented 
to the Court because page limits and the need to cover many relevant issues prevent the litigants 
themselves from devoting much space to arguments about a clause’s original meaning.184 
Amicus briefs, no less than the litigants’ briefs, are meant to persuade rather than to inform,185 
and therefore they may lack the objectivity that might be found in a dispassionate historical 
treatise.  When briefs present arguments based on non-legal fields of expertise, the justices and 
their clerks may have difficulty judging the validity of those arguments because they simply do 
not have the necessary expertise in the underlying field.186 This concern has been raised 
regarding the Court’s use of social science research and data from empirical studies,187 but the 
 
183 Kevin J. Worthen, Shirt-Tales: Clerking for Byron White, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 349, 354. 
184 See Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 603, 606 (1984) (“Because of page limits, or 
considerations of tone and emphasis, parties are frequently forced to make some of the points they wish to make in 
rather abbreviated form. A supportive amicus can flesh out those points with additional discussion and citation of 
authority.”); see also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 181, at 830 (“Amicus briefs matter insofar as they provide 
legally relevant information not supplied by the parties to the case—information that assists the Court in reaching 
the correct decision as defined by the complex norms of our legal culture.”). 
185 Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus 
Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 99–100 (1993). 
186 Id. 
187 See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, The Empirical Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, 13 AM. J.L. &
MED. 335, 337–45 (1987) (describing problems with the Court’s interpretation of empirical studies that were 
presented as evidence in two capital murder cases); Donald N. Bersoff & David J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman: The 
Supreme Court’s Continuing Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 279, 288–93 
(1995) (criticizing Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), because 
“Justice Kennedy cited only three isolated, marginally analogous studies from which he drew conclusions that were 
unwarranted and went far beyond those to which the authors of the studies themselves came.”); Mark G. Yudof, 
School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court,
42 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1978, at 57, 70 (noting that the social science data the Court relied on in Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), “was methodologically unsound”); see also, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, 
supra note 185, at 128 (analyzing the empirical studies cited by amicus briefs submitted in three major Supreme 
Court punitive damages cases and finding “a systematic misuse of empirical research” by these amicus briefs, “a 
phenomenon [the authors] call[ed] ‘junk social science’”). 
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same problem exists when the justices rely on the necessarily advocacy-oriented historical 
accounts presented to the Court in amicus briefs.  Scholars have expressed concern about 
“advocacy disguised as social science in amicus curiae briefs” and about the Court’s difficulty in 
evaluating the arguments presented in such briefs.188 In Kelo, an amicus brief submitted by the 
Claremont Institute189 in support of the petitioners was the only brief that solely addressed the 
question of “[w]hether the original meaning of . . . the Public Use Clause requires the public 
actually to use the property it takes,”190 whereas the litigants’ briefs’ discussion of the Clause’s 
original meaning was far more limited.191 This amicus brief was certainly aimed at persuading 
the Court to adopt a particular position,192 and as is discussed below, Thomas appears to taken 
many of the arguments in his dissent directly from the Claremont Institute’s brief without 
applying enough scrutiny to its misleading version of history.193 
The justices and their clerks are trained as lawyers.  Properly evaluating historically-
based arguments such as those in the Claremont Brief requires them to become expert historians, 
something they may simply not have the time to do between the first Monday in October and the 
last Monday in June.  Comparing the Claremont Brief to Thomas’ Kelo dissent illustrates the 
importance of subjecting the arguments in such a brief to critical analysis and careful scrutiny.   
The Claremont Brief, like Thomas’ dissent, begins by discussing the definition of “use” in 
 
188 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 185, at 99–100, 119–22. 
189 The Claremont Institute’s self-described mission is “to restore the principles of the American Founding to their 
rightful, preeminent authority in our national life.” The Claremont Institute, http://www.claremont.org (last visited 
July 21, 2006).  
190 Brief of Amicus Curiae The Claremont Institute et al. in Support of Petitioners at i, Kelo v. City of New London, 
125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108) [hereinafter “Claremont Brief”].  The Claremont Brief essentially summarizes 
the arguments made in a 2004 article written by one of the authors.  See generally Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use 
Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877. 
191 Brief of the Respondents at 28–32, Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (No. 04-108); Reply Brief of Petitioner’s at 2–3, Kelo,
125 S. Ct. 2655 (No. 04-108). 
192 See Claremont Brief, supra note 190, at 5 (“The Court should strive to do what Justice Thomas did for 
Commerce Clause doctrine in his concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez: Construe its public use 
‘jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of [its] more recent case law and is more faithful to the original 
meaning of that Clause.’ 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995).”). 
193 See infra notes 194–233 and accompanying text. 
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Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language.194 As was discussed above, Johnson’s 
definition is far less conclusive than either the Claremont Institute or Thomas indicate.195 The 
Claremont Institute argues that Johnson’s other definitions for “use” such as “convenience” and 
“help” were “merely . . . secondary meaning[s], not the most common meaning of the word.”196 
The Institute provides no authority for this proposition, and Johnson’s Dictionary does not 
indicate the how common or uncommon of any of the nine definitions of the word “use” actually 
were during the late eighteenth century.197 Thomas’ focus on this argument indicates that he 
may simply have accepted the accuracy of this textual analysis without conducting any 
meaningful independent research into the issue. 
Thomas also does not seem to have scrutinized the Claremont Institute’s selective 
quotations of Blackstone’s Commentaries. Both Thomas and the Claremont Institute completely 
omit Blackstone’s distinction between the legislature’s authority to take private property in 
exchange for compensation and the arbitrary confiscations by the Crown that Blackstone and 
others sought to eradicate.198 Rather, both emphasize that Blackstone describes the eminent 
domain transaction as one in which “the public is now considered as an individual, treating with 
an individual for an exchange,”199 apparently to imply that the public must use the taken property 
in the same way that an individual purchaser would.  But both omit Blackstone’s very next 
sentence, in which he explains that this transaction is quite different from a land sale between 
private parties: “All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for 
 
194 Claremont Brief, supra note 190, at 6 (citing 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(8th ed. 1786)).  Justice Thomas cited Johnson’s fourth edition, which was published in 1773.  See supra note 30. 
195 See supra notes 30–39 and accompanying text. 
196 Claremont Brief, supra note 190, at 6. 
197 To be sure, the definition that Thomas and the Brief’s authors prefer is the first definition listed, but there is no 
indication that the second, fourth, or fifth definitions were not as common or nearly so.  See supra note 39 and 
accompanying text. 
198 See supra notes 90–102 and accompanying text. 
199 Claremont Brief, supra note 190, at 12 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at 135 (Claremont Brief’s 
emphasis)); see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting the same passage). 
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a reasonable price.”200 A close reading of Blackstone, then, casts doubt on the Claremont 
Institute’s contention that “Blackstone’s understanding of eminent domain left no room for the 
broad reading of ‘public usefulness.’”201 Thomas’ complete adoption of the Claremont 
Institute’s arguments to that effect suggest that he did not independently analyze the actual text 
of Blackstone’s Commentaries.
These examples demonstrate that historical research depends on first-hand examination 
of primary sources, an endeavor in which the justices and their clerks, often recent law-school 
graduates,202 have had little training or experience.  The Claremont Institute does, however, 
devote several pages of its brief to discussing a primary source of a type quite familiar to the 
justices and their law clerks—a court opinion.  Specifically, the Claremont Institute points to 
Supreme Court Justice William Patterson’s 1795 circuit court opinion in Vanhorne’s Lessee v. 
Dorrance203 and notes that “the Institute is not aware of any primary source that explains how 
1790s-era Americans understood public use limitations better than [that] opinion.”204 The 
Claremont Brief compares Patterson’s statement that “it is  . . . difficult to form a case, in which 
the necessity can be of such a nature, as to authorise or excuse the seizing of landed property 
belonging to one citizen, and giving it to another citizen”205 with the Connecticut law at issue in 
 
200 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at 135 (emphasis added).  Neither Thomas nor the Claremont Institute would 
likely be comforted by Blackstone’s reassurance that “oblig[ing] the owner to alienate his possessions” is “[a]ll that 
the legislature does.” 
201 Claremont Brief, supra note 190, at 12; see also supra notes 90–102 and accompanying text. 
202 Three of Thomas’ four clerks for the October 2004 term graduated law school in 2003 (the fourth graduated in 
2002), and all of their post-law school work experience consisted only of clerking for federal judges.  List of Law 
Clerks of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_law_clerks_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States (last visited Aug. 4, 
2006). 
203 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795); Claremont Brief, supra note 190, at 14–16.  Vanhorne’s Lessee is one of 
several that Thomas cites to support the proposition that “the Public Use Clause . . . embodied the Framers’ 
understanding that property is a natural, fundamental right, prohibiting the government from ‘tak[ing] property from 
A. and giv[ing] it to B.’” Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Vanhorne’s Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 
at 311; other citations omitted). 
204 Claremont Brief, supra note 190, at 14. 
205 Id. at 15 (quoting Vanhorne’s Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 311). 
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Kelo that, according to the Claremont Brief, “presumes that city officials may and should 
redistribute land in whatever way is most advantageous for their cities.”206 This “stark contrast” 
leads to the Brief to conclude with Patterson’s words that “it is infinitely wiser and safer to risk 
some possible mischiefs than to vest in the legislature so unnecessary, dangerous, and enormous 
a power.”207 The clear implication is that taking property from one citizen and giving it to 
another was the “dangerous . . . power” that Patterson did not want to vest in the legislature, and 
that such a taking was not considered a public use in 1795. 
Although Thomas does not discuss Vanhorne’s Lessee, he cites it as supporting the 
proposition that “the Public Use Clause . . . prohibit[s] the government from ‘tak[ing] property 
from A. and giv[ing] it to B.’”208 It seems likely, however, that Thomas’ citation to the case was 
based on the Claremont Institute’s analysis rather than on his or his clerks’ own review of 
Patterson’s opinion because, had they done so, they undoubtedly would have realized that the 
case in fact supports the nearly opposite proposition—that the legislature unquestionably has full 
authority to take property from one person and give it to another, as long as certain procedures 
are followed.209 The “unnecessary, dangerous, and enormous . . . power” that to which Patterson 
referred was not the power to take property from one citizen and vest it in another.  Rather, in the 
next sentence after the one quoted in the Claremont Brief, Patterson explains the power that 
 
206 Id. at 16. 
207 Claremont Brief, supra note 190, at 16 (quoting Vanhorne’s Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 312). 
208 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (alterations in original).  The internal quotation is actually taken 
from Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798), although as is noted above, Calder says little about the scope 
of public use.  See supra note 113. 
209 Vanhorne’s Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 312.  Patterson explains that “untoward must be the state of things, that 
would induce the legislature, supposing they had the power, to divest one individual of his landed estate merely for 
the purpose of vesting it in another, even upon full indemnification, unless that indemnification be ascertained in the 
manner which I shall mention hereafter.” Id. (emphasis added). Patterson then goes on to explain the procedure that 
would make such a taking permissible. See infra note 220 and accompanying text. 
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concerns him: that “the Legislature judged of the necessity of the case, and also of the nature and 
value of the equivalent.”210 
For Patterson, the potential for abuse lay in the legislature’s combined power to decide 
both that an appropriation of private property was necessary and to determine the amount of 
compensation that the landowner would receive: “Such a case of necessity, and judging too of
the compensation, can never occur in any nation.”211 Although Patterson could have limited this 
“dangerous . . . power” by placing a substantive limit on the legislature’s authority to determine 
the necessity of the taking, he did not.  Instead, Patterson eliminated the legislature’s authority to 
determine the amount and form of compensation.212 
Patterson writes in the typically convoluted style of eighteenth century jurists, but his 
analysis proceeds in logical steps.  Patterson first observes that “the preservation of property . . . 
is a primary object of the social compact” and draws the conclusion that “[t]he legislature, 
therefore, has no authority to . . . divest[] one citizen of his freehold and vest[] it in another 
without a just compensation.”213 Next, Patterson goes a step further and inquire whether the 
legislature can “make an act divesting one citizen of his freehold and vesting it in another, even 
with compensation.”  Patterson’s answer to this question illuminates his understanding of the 
social compact, of the common welfare, and of the importance that the republican form of 
government has for safeguarding that welfare:  
That the legislature, on certain emergencies, had authority to exercise 
this high power, has been urged from the nature of the social compact . . 
. . The despotic power, as it is aptly called by some writers, of taking 
private property, when state necessity requires, exists in every 
government; the existence of such power is necessary; government could 
not subsist without it; and if this be the case, it cannot be lodged any 
 
210 Vanhorne’s Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 312. 
211 Id. (emphasis added). 
212 Id. at 312–13. 
213 Id. at 310 (emphasis added). 
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where with so much safety as with the Legislature. The presumption is, 
that they will not call it into exercise except in urgent cases, or cases of 
the first necessity.214 
The context for the key passage quoted by the Claremont Institute mentioned above215 is 
now clearer.  Patterson had difficulty imagining that the common good would ever necessitate 
transferring property from one citizen to another: “it is . . . difficult to form a case in which the 
necessity of a State can be of such a nature as to authorize or excuse the seizing of landed 
property belonging to one citizen and giving it to another citizen.”216 He nevertheless believed 
that if such a situation arose, it would be the legislature’s “sole and exclusive” authority to 
determine that the taking was necessary.217 This, then, led to his concern that the legislature 
would be both the judge of that necessity as well as the judge of the amount of compensation to 
be paid.218 Contrary to the Claremont Institute’s implication, however, Patterson’s solution was 
not to narrow the meaning of public use or to increase judicial oversight of the legislature’s 
determination of necessity.  Rather, Patterson explained that “the legislature can take the real 
estate of A. and give it to B. on making compensation, the principle and reasoning upon it go no 
further than to show that the legislature are the sole and exclusive judges of the necessity of the 
case, in which this despotic power should be called into action.”219 “But,” Patterson declared, 
“here the legislature must stop. . . . [t]hey cannot constitutionally determine upon the amount of 
compensation, or value of the land.”220 
214 Id. at 310–11 (emphasis added). 
215 See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
216 Vanhorne’s Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 311. 
217 Id. at 312. 
218 Id.
219 Id. (emphasis added).  
220 Id. Patterson explained that the legislature “cannot constitutionally determine . . . the amount of the 
compensation, or value of the land,” because “[p]ublic exigencies do not require . . . that the legislature should, of 
themselves, without the participation of the proprietor, or intervention of a jury, assess the value of the thing, or 
ascertain the amount of the compensation to be paid for it.”  Id. at 312–13.  Patterson’s opinion in Vanhorne’s 
Lessee goes on to describe three ways that the amount of compensation could be determined: (1) “by the parties—
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 Although Patterson’s language is difficult to parse, a careful reading of the opinion by a 
Supreme Court clerk would undoubtedly have uncovered the fact that Vanhorne’s Lessee does 
not at all support a narrow understanding of public use as implied by the Claremont Brief. 
Thomas’ citation of Vanhorne’s Lessee to support such a narrow understanding suggests that 
perhaps a careful reading was not done.  One other aspect of Vanhorne’s Lessee that might have 
led Thomas and his clerks to question the Claremont Institute’s textual arguments concerns the 
constitutional provision at issue in the case—the Takings Clause in the Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1790.221 Although this Takings Clause refers to property “taken or applied to 
public use,” Justice Patterson never once mentions the words “public use.”  Instead, he discusses 
the legislature’s authority to take property “for public purposes” and “for the good of the 
community”222 and primarily focuses on the legislature’s sole authority to determine that “the 
public exigencies, or necessities of the State,” require a particular taking of private property.223 
Patterson’s language undermines the argument raised by the Claremont Institute and echoed by 
Thomas in his Kelo dissent that Americans in Justice Patterson’s generation understood the 
words “public use” as having a distinct and more narrow meaning than the words “public 
 
that is, by stipulation between the legislature and the proprietor of the land,” (2) “by commissioners mutually elected 
by the parties,” or (3) “by the intervention of a jury.”  Id. at 313. 
221 “[N]or shall any man’s property be taken or applied to public use, without the consent of his representatives, and 
without just compensation being made.” PA. CONST. art. IX, § 10 (1790). 
222 Vanhorne’s Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 310. 
223 Id. at 312 (emphasis added). Vanhorne’s Lessee is one of many early federal and state court decisions that 
describe “public use” in similar terms.  E.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 394 (U.S. 1798) (“for the benefit of 
the whole community”); Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Van Ness, 2 F. Cas. 574, 576 (C.C.D.D.C. 1835) (“public benefit” 
and “public convenience”); Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467, 476 (1832) (“public 
. . . interest and benefit”); State v. Town of Hampton, 2 N.H. 22, 25 (1819) (“public purposes”); Scudder v. Trenton 
Delaware Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694 (N.J. Ch. 1832) (“public importance and utility” and “public use or benefit”); 
Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 16 (N.Y. 1837) (“benefit which is to result to the public”); 
id. at 24 (opinion of Edwards, Sen.) (“public purposes”); id. at 47 (opinion of Maison, Sen.) (“public interest and 
convenience”); Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45 (N.Y. Ch. 1831) (“public interest” or “benefit to the 
public”); Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (“public purposes”); Den ex dem. 
Robinson v. Barfield, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 390, 420 (1818) (opinion of Daniel, J.) (“public purposes”); Buckingham v. 
Smith, 10 Ohio 288, 297 (1840) (“public use, or . . . public welfare”); Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 Bay 38 (S.C. 
1796) (opinion of Waties, J.) (“public utility”); Harding v. Goodlett, 11 Tenn. (3 Yerg.) 41, 52 (1832) (“interests of 
the community” and “good of the whole”); Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245, 264 (1828) (“public 
purposes”). 
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exigencies” or “public necessity” that appeared in pre-1791 documents such as the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780, the Vermont Constitution of 1786, and the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787.224 
Although the Claremont Brief was the only submission to the Court in Kelo that focused 
solely on the Public Use Clause’s original meaning, some of the other briefs argued that a broad 
conception of public use was common during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
and these briefs pointed to academic research that would have provided enough information to 
uncover much of the historical evidence presented in this article.  The Brief of the Respondents 
cites extensive articles by John F. Hart225 and Errol P. Meindinger226 to demonstrate that early 
states often “redirected private property towards some other private use thought to be more 
advantageous for the common good.”227 The Respondents explain that the framers expressed 
little concern about defining the scope of public use because they “may well have assumed that 
representative government would adequately protect against abuses of eminent domain.”228 
Several other amicus briefs relied extensively on Mathew P. Harrington’s work229 to support the 
proposition that “American legislatures repeatedly used their power of expropriation to effect all 
manner of social and economic engineering, frequently transferring property from one private 
entity to another where it was thought that the transfer would effect some greater economic 
purpose.”230 These amicus briefs also discussed the extent that civic republican ideas influenced 
 
224 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Claremont Brief, supra note 190, at 13–14; see also supra 
notes 68–76 and accompanying text. 
225 John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1252 (1996). 
226 Meidinger, supra note 45. 
227 Brief of the Respondents, supra note 191, at 30–32 (citing Hart, supra note 225, at 1282–83). 
228 Id. at 29 (quoting Meidinger, supra note 45, at 17–18). 
229 Harrington, supra note 45. 
230 Brief of Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (BUILD) et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 12–14, Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (No. 04-108) (quoting Harrington, supra note 45, at 1247); see Brief of 
the National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6, Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (No. 04-
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the founders and explained that if “public use” was meant to be a substantive limitation on 
eminent domain, the Fifth Amendment would have been more explicit about the matter because 
“[s]uch a limit would have been a monumental alteration in the nature of representative 
government as understood by the members of the founding generation.”231 One amicus brief 
even mentions the doubts expressed by John Lewis—the author of the 1888 treatise that Thomas 
extensively relies on in his Kelo dissent—about whether the Public Use Clause was ever 
intended to be a substantive limitation at all.232 Although none of these briefs devote as much 
space as does the Claremont Brief to the Public Use Clause’s original meaning, they pointed the 
Court towards an extensive body of research about the understanding of “public use” during the 
early American period that directly contradicts the account presented by the Claremont Institute.   
Of course, most cases require the justices to choose between contradictory and often 
well-supported arguments, and the problem with Thomas’ dissent is not that he found the 
Claremont Institute’s arguments more persuasive than those presented by other amici.  Rather, 
Thomas’ failure to acknowledge any of the primary and secondary sources that cast considerable 
 
108) [hereinafter “Nat’l League of Cities Brief”] (citing Harrington, supra note 45, at 1299–1301, for the 
proposition that “[t]here is no evidence the Framers were concerned about the purposes for which eminent domain is 
employed”); Brief for the Massachusetts Chapter of the National Ass’n of Industrial and Office Properties as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5–8 & nn.10, 17–18, 22, Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (No. 04-108) 
[hereinafter “Massachusetts Brief”] (quoting extensively from Harrington, supra note 45); see also Brief of the 
American Planning Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6, Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (No. 04-108) 
[hereinafter “APA Brief”] (“During the colonial and early national periods, the understanding about the permissible 
scope of eminent domain appears to have been . . . that the power could be used for any purpose consistent with 
public benefit or advantage.” (citing Meidinger, supra note 45, at 25)). 
231 Massachusetts Brief, supra note 230, at 8 n.22 (quoting Harrington, supra note 45, at 1300–01); see also APA 
Brief, supra note 230, at 7 n.18 (“[T]he compensation clause was protective of minority rights, and thus satisfied 
federalist fears that a landless majority might gain control of the national legislature and impose confiscating 
regulations on property . . . .” (quoting Harrington, supra note 45, at 1297)). 
232 National League of Cities Brief, supra note 230, at 6 (citing LEWIS, supra note 27, at ii, for the proposition that 
“the language of the Takings Clause does not impose any limitation other than the payment of just compensation”).  
The citation refers to Lewis’ preface in which he notes that “[i]t is certainly questionable whether anything more 
was intended by the provision . . . than as though it read, ‘Private property shall not be taken under the power of 
eminent domain without just compensation.’”  LEWIS, supra note 27, at ii; see also supra notes 44–49 and 
accompanying text. 
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doubt on the traditional property-rights view of the Public Use Clause233 suggests that Thomas 
and his clerks may not have conducted the sort of in-depth historical research required for an 
accurate analysis of the Public Use Clause’s original meaning.  Originalism as a judicial 
decisionmaking methodology depends on accurate historical research.  Such research takes time, 
especially for non-experts, a group that includes the justices and their clerks.  The omissions, 
mischaracterizations, and inaccuracies in an opinion authored by the Court’s most ardent 
supporter of originalism suggest that perhaps originalist methodologies cannot be reliably 
implemented under the constraints of Supreme Court litigation. 
 
233 See supra notes 33, 42–49 and accompanying text. 
